The Importance of Policy Instruments for Managing Principal-Agent Relationships in the Administration of Elections: The Case of Performance Benchmarking in the UK

Abstract

Concerns about electoral integrity have often been raised in many established democracies in recent years because of a number of errors made in the administration of elections. Local election officials (LEOs) have frequently been blamed for such errors. This paper conceptualises the implementation of election administration in democracies in terms of a number of principal-agent relationships. It then argues that adopting appropriate policy instruments to manage these relationships can improve the administration of elections and electoral integrity. The paper provides a case study of the use of performance management schemes in the UK 2008-2010. Semi-structured interviews with 74 LEOs subject to newly devised performance indicators were undertaken from 41 organisations. These suggest that performance benchmarking can be a useful policy instrument for encouraging learning amongst those involved in implementing elections and a method of control for principals seeking to manage LEOs. The personal reputations of LEOs were found to be a strong incentive for them to comply with centrally defined standards as they did not wish to be associated with ‘failure’.