Developing the Governance Capacity of Local Elected Officials

Abstract

The job of local elected officials (LEOs) in governing municipalities is a complicated and demanding one. How LEOs handle their jobs affects taxpayers and their communities' present and future generations. The task of LEO development involves learning and is a public issue. LEOs govern in the context of representative democracy. Once installed in office, LEOs are trustees for the voters, acting as lawmakers, policy makers, and fiduciary agents.(1) They make laws, policies, and budget allocations as the authoritative decisions of city councils. Their decisions can involve a single choice about an immediate and narrowly focused problem. In response to broader, longer-term issues, they can make a series of decisions that they formalize in public policies (Salisbury, 1968). Because of citizen demands, court orders, and the devolution of governmental authority, cities have expanded their scope beyond the traditional mix of police, fire, and public works. Therefore, the substance of their policy decisions has a broad range.(2) Citizens expect LEOs' collective decisions to produce the following outcomes: an array of municipal services; the protection of people, property, and the environment; prohibitions of certain types of behaviors; a local economy that attracts and retains residents and businesses; and plans for the future. Effective LEOs must cooperate with many people within their cities and coordinate their decisions with other elected officials. Some of their decisions affect multiple jurisdictions, as with infrastructure development; other decisions, such as airport expansion, have global impact. Often the choices of LEOs conflict with the preferences of their constituents or the campaign promises that helped them win office. Understanding the difference between making citizens happy and doing the right thing is difficult for LEOs. Rather than wrestle with hard dilemmas, most LEOs rely on instinct and guesswork for making trade-offs (Hammond, Keeney, and Raiffa, 1998). LEOs'jobs are laden with conflict because municipal governance occurs in the arena. Cities are subdivisions of state governments. They are territorially based organizations; LEOs derive their authority from the democratic system.(3) To govern effectively, LEOs must create processes, relationships, and entities that produce sound municipal organizations (Frederickson, 1989). A sound municipality provides public goods for its citizens. Public goods, as distinguished from nonpublic goods, are those that citizens collectively consume, and the benefits of their consumption are indivisible (Downs, 1967). Some examples of public goods are clean air and clean water. As actors in the system, LEOs are obligated to formulate policies and allocate resources in support of public goods. Because municipalities are not market-driven entities, they cannot rely solely on the citizenry's voluntary contributions to support them (Olson, 1973). LEOs' authority to tax residents determines who pays for public goods consumed in their cities. Their policies concerning the provision of public goods usually require a redistribution of incomes, and those from whom they take money may not yield without sanctions (Downs, 1967). To maintain municipal organizations, LEOs must assert leadership as political (Olson, 1973; Salisbury, 1969).(4) Political entrepreneurs create incentives that will attract citizens to bear willingly the costs of providing an optimal supply of public goods.(5) It is no surprise to find that most municipalities deliver a mix of public and nonpublic goods to raise revenues. LEOs' determination of the appropriate mix of public and nonpublic goods is controversial (Sharp, Register, and Leftwich, 1990). Because this controversy is a judgment, it arouses conflict and disagreements. The fragmentation of power and authority in the democratic system intensifies these disagreements and compels LEOs to manage conflict (Schattschneider, 1960). …