The Impact of Veto Players on Incremental and Drastic Policy Making: Australia's Carbon Tax Policy and Its Repeal

Abstract

Does the number, ideological congruence, and/or individual cohesion of veto actors influence policy making to be incremental or drastic? Rather than compare veto actors across different states as is already extensively addressed, this article compares the different veto actors involved in Australia's 2011 Carbon Tax Policy and its 2014 “Carbon Tax Repeal” policy. It uses quantitative data to measure the number, ideological congruence, and individual cohesion of the different veto actors. The results show that, because of the smaller number of veto actors, their higher ideological congruence, and lower individual cohesion, policy making was rather drastic than incremental for the 2014 repeal policy compared to the 2011 Carbon Tax Policy. The results, however, challenge the assumption that many veto actors hinder effective policy change and suggest that because a single or few veto actors can easily execute drastic policy making, they can likewise easily halt effective policy. These have implications for policy making.Related ArticlesBåtstrand, Sondre. 2015. “More than Markets: A Comparative Study of Nine Conservative Parties on Climate Change.” Politics & Policy 43 (4): 538‐561. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12122Fisher, Sarah. 2015. “Federalism's Fractured Decision Making in the Kyoto Protocol.” Politics & Policy 43 (1): 1‐29. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12110Kwon, Sung‐Wook, and Sylvia Gonzalez‐Gorman. 2019. “Influence of Local Political Institutions on Policy Punctuation in Three Policy Areas.” Politics & Policy 47 (2): 300‐325. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12295