Abstract
AbstractIn the airline industry, deregulation is progressing both domestically and internationally. In an increasingly competitive environment, airlines are seeking to survive through acquisitions, mergers, and cooperation. Covid-19 is believed to have strengthened this trend. It has been shown that competition in the air transportation industry has been weakened by multi-market contact (MMC). However, there have not been many studies on the relationship between the MMC effect and cooperation. This paper analyzes the relationship between MMC and cooperation including code-sharing agreements and consignments in the U.S. airline industry. The impact of MMC on fares set by marketing carriers—those who sell seats for operating carriers that actually operate—is analyzed in relation to the number of operating carriers involved in the operation of the market. The analysis shows that cooperation enhances the MMC effects of producing higher fares, and that the collusion effect of MMC is weakened in cases where the marketing carrier itself operates as an operating carrier.KeywordsCooperationMultimarket contact (MMC)U.S. airline industry
Published Version
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