The impact of behavior safety management system on coal mine work safety: A system dynamics model of quadripartite evolutionary game

Abstract

Employees’ unsafe behavior is the main cause of coal mine accidents, and an effective and efficient coal mine behavior safety management (CMBSM) system is critical to ensuring coal mine work safety. To explore the impact of CMBSM system on coal mine work safety, a four-player evolutionary game model of the CMBSM system including organizations, managers, coal miners, and groups is developed. Then, the behavior strategy interactions and evolution processes of stakeholders in the CMBSM system are analyzed in combination with system dynamics modeling. Moreover, the impacts of key parameters on the decision-making behavior of stakeholders are analyzed based on the distribution proportion of rewards and penalties in the context of organization incentives applied for Chinese coal mines. The results are as follows. First, the initial strategy combinations affect the overall stability of the CMBSM system. Second, the quadripartite evolutionary game applied for the CMBSM system has a long-term rebound effect under the static reward proportion strategy. Then, the positive incentive behaviors of organizations cannot be maintained for a long time under the static penalty proportion strategy. Finally, the CMBSM system can evolve to the best stable state under the combined dynamic reward and dynamic penalty proportion strategies. Some behavior safety management strategies that can improve coal mine work safety are offered based on the results. More importantly, the results confirm the importance of strengthening behavior safety management for coal mine work safety and raise new avenues for safety management in other industries.