Abstract

Defenders of the modern presidency allege that Congress is ill-equipped to design public policies adequate to a rapidly changing society. Because the president is positioned to use expertise to circumvent logrolling and horse trading—so goes this rationale—the presidency should effectively replace Congress as the polity's substantive legislator. Scholars have studied the advantages and pitfalls of this presidential model, but few have viewed the Eisenhower presidency through this lens. The case of the 1956 Federal Highway Act suggests that, like his predecessors, Eisenhower tried to supplant Congress as the polity's primary legislator. Further, seemingly self-defeating decisions on Eisenhower's part can be helpfully interpreted as consequences of institutional and ideational forces beyond his control.

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