The Growth of a "Popular" Japanese Communist Party

Abstract

OMMENTING ON THE RESULTS of the i969 General Election in which the Japan Communist (JCP) tripled its number of seats in the lower house, the late Liberal-Democratic (LDP) Vice-President, Shojiro Kawashima, predicted, seventies will be an era of confrontation between the LDP and the Japan Communist Party. The remark was quickly picked up by media and the JCP itself and has since gained wide currency. Although talk of LDP-JCP confrontation may appear premature, with the LDP at the beginning of I972 holding 299 seats in the 486 seat lower house compared to the JCP's I4 (or I5 if the Okinawan People's dietman is included), the JCP has been markedly increasing its influence among the Japanese as reflected in election results in recent years. It is one of two Japanese political parties that has been making constant and successful efforts to increase its electoral strength. The other is the Komeito (Clean Government Party), the polits-al arm of the militant Buddhist Soka Gakkai (Value Creation Society) and the JCP's arch-enemy. The initial policy of the JCP in the postwar period was laid down by Sanzo Nosaka and the party's Central Committee in i946 and remained the basic Communist policy until Cominform criticism in I950. The party sought to demonstrate its deep concern for the welfare of the masses and advanced the notion of a Communist Party engaged in peaceful revolution. In four years Nosaka's concept built an organization of ioo,ooo members and in the general election of i949 the Communists polled io percent of the total vote. The era of making the JCP lovable and attuned to Japanese nationalism ended abruptly, however, with the January i950 attack by Moscow, seconded by Peking, on Nosaka's tactics and the resultant line of ultra-leftist adventurism on which the party embarked. Membership and electoral support shriveled and the prewar image of a conspiratorial party controlled from abroad was revived. In the election which followed the violent I952 May Day demonstrations the party's strength in the lower house dropped from 35 seats to one. In I955 the party was allowed by Moscow and Peking to abandon this unrewarding strategy of militancy and outright violence that had been forced upon it be-