Abstract

For many observers Australia’s approach to the threat of nuclear proliferation under the government of Prime Minister John Howard (1996–2007) was simply the product of its steadfast alignment of Australian foreign policy with that of the United States in the post-9/11 context. The Howard government’s enthusiastic support for the 2003 US-led ‘coalition of the willing’ invasion of Iraq on the basis of Baghdad’s alleged possession of ‘weapons of mass destruction’ (WMD) is taken as the most egregious example of this tendency. Yet this assumption ignores that the potential threat of nuclear proliferation had been an abiding concern for the government since it had entered office. This paper argues that there was an enduring dynamic in Australian foreign and strategic policy of perceiving a direct link between the fate of the prevailing international system and that of Australia’s own national security. To this end, the Howard government’s perception of the threat of nuclear proliferation was sensitive to trends at the global level, most particularly the strategic posture and preferences of its alliance partner, the United States. The paper demonstrates, however, that this weakened the Howard government’s ability to maintain fidelity with what had become Australia’s traditional activist diplomacy within the non-proliferation regime.

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