The governance of irresponsible new energy vehicle members considering differentiated subsidies

Abstract

Differentiated government subsidies are indispensable for the advancement of new energy vehicles (NEVs), while irresponsible behaviors always occur which may lead to resource misallocation and need to be supervised. Hence, a tripartite evolutionary game model is constructed, considering differentiated subsidies and irresponsible behaviors. The main results are as follows. (1) Government strategies are relative to subsidy expenditure and penalty revenue, and these factors exhibit a non-negligible influence on the speed of the government's decision progress, which implies the necessity of establishing a flexible and dynamic subsidy mechanism. (2) Governance intensity and penalty fines should be improved to effectively regulate irresponsible behaviors, but they need timely adjustment to avoid the slackness of irresponsible manufacturers and retailers. Moreover, restricting the expected revenue of irresponsible behaviors is another scheme to regulate their engagement. (3) Profit changes will influence the strategies of the NEV supply chain participants, and upstream participants' profits have a unilateral impact on downstream participants.