Abstract
AbstractThe chapter begins with an examination of three philosophical theses about free will, each of which would, if true, refute Theist's attempt to reply to the argument from evil by employing the free-will defence: compatibilism; the incompatibility of free will and divine foreknowledge; and the existence of ‘middle knowledge’. It is shown how Theist can cast sufficient doubt on these theses to block Atheist's attempt at conversion. The body of the chapter is devoted to Atheist's contention that the free-will defence cannot account for ‘natural evil’. Theist is represented as employing a version of the free-will defence that postulates a primordial separation of our remote ancestors from God, and as defending the conclusion that according to this story, the suffering of human beings that is caused proximately by natural evils might also be remotely caused by the abuse of free will.
Published Version
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