Abstract
Following the Maastricht Treaty, the German Lander won unprecedented, collective rights of input into German EU policy making, extending across a wide range of EU policy fields. An analysis of Lander policy on EU eastern enlargement — focused here on Bavaria and Saxony ‐ points to a dilemma for the Lander in exercising these rights. Divergences of interest and priority militate against the generation of collective majority decisions. Beneath a veneer of generalised support for the enlargement process, individual Lander have different perspectives on enlargement conditioned by self‐interest rather than collective interest. While this is unlikely significantly to hinder the enlargement process, the pursuit of self‐interest seems set in key areas to pitch the Lander into conflict with the applicant states over resources, locational competition, and the scope of European‐level intervention.
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