Abstract

This paper is an extension of previous research on the geography of union elections. A model of union organization is proposed, relevant to the institutional and political structure of US labor legislation. Implications are drawn for unions' organizing strategies, and their likely electoral performance at the local level. It is argued that the structural imperatives faced by unions are inherently incomplete; local discretion is built-in to the structure of labor relations. Alternative empirical forms of the proposed model are considered and the advantages of a probit methodology discussed. Empirical analysis is based upon representation elections involving the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers union and the United Auto Workers union over the period 1970–82. To illustrate the implications of the derived empirical results, a series of scenarios are discussed involving both unions and their possible options for organizing at the local level.

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