Abstract
Super-substantivalism (of the type we’ll consider) roughly comprises two core tenets: (1) the physical properties which we attribute to matter (e.g. charge or mass) can be attributed to spacetime directly, with no need for matter as an extraneous carrier “on top of” spacetime; (2) spacetime is more fundamental than (ontologically prior to) matter. In the present paper, we revisit a recent argument in favour of super-substantivalism, based on General Relativity. A critique is offered that highlights the difference between (various accounts of) fundamentality and (various forms of) ontological dependence. This affords a metaphysically more perspicuous view of what super-substantivalism’s tenets actually assert, and how it may be defended. We tentatively propose a re-formulation of the original argument that not only seems to apply to all classical physics, but also chimes with a standard interpretation of spacetime theories in the philosophy of physics.
Highlights
Super-substantivalism is a view about the relation between spacetime and material objects
Besides an analysis and qualified defence of priority super-substantivalism, our paper can be seen as a case study for the germane tools and concepts, developed in analytic metaphysics, applied to modern physics
And 4, we critically examine them from the perspective of philosophy of physics, and of metaphysics, respectively. These sections explore different ways of fleshing out and extend the core super-substantivalist commitment—different ways that we find problematic. This is important, we contend, because it paves the way for our positive proposal on how to reformulate and develop priority super-substantivalism in a way that steers clear of the aforementioned problems (Sect. 5)
Summary
Super-substantivalism is a view (or rather: a family of views) about the relation between spacetime and material objects (such as neutrons, electromagnetic waves or axolotls). Besides an analysis and qualified defence of priority super-substantivalism, our paper can be seen as a case study for the germane tools and concepts, developed in analytic metaphysics, applied to modern physics. This illustrates their salient, and sometimes subtle, differences; it shows the fertility of the cooperation between analytic metaphysics and philosophy of physics—and how thereby they can mutually constrain, and refine, each other’s insights. 3 and 4, we critically examine them from the perspective of philosophy of physics, and of metaphysics, respectively These sections explore different ways of fleshing out and extend the core super-substantivalist commitment—different ways that we find problematic. This is important, we contend, because it paves the way for our positive proposal on how to reformulate and develop priority super-substantivalism in a way that steers clear of the aforementioned problems (Sect. 5)
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