The Fundamental Conundrum

Abstract

Abstract Any effort to articulate a theory of religious freedom, I will argue in this chapter, founders on a basic theoretical conundrum. The function of a theory of religious freedom is to mediate among a variety of competing religious and secular positions and interests, or to explain how government ought to deal with these competing positions and interests. To perform that function, however, the theory will tacitly but inevitably privilege, or prefer in advance, one of those positions while rejecting or discounting others. But a theory that privileges one of the competing positions and rejects others a priori is not truly a theory of religious freedom at all-or, at least, it is not the sort of theory that modern proponents of religious freedom have sought to develop. This is a simple statement of the conundrum; my purpose in this chapter is to elaborate the problem. The argument must begin by emphasizing a fact that is perhaps obvious but is also, I think, underappreciated: Theories of religious freedom are not self-subsistent, nor are they created ex nihilo. A theory of religious freedom is not sound or unsound, convincing or unconvincing, in the abstract. Rather, any account of religious freedom will necessarily depend on - and hence will stand or fall along with - more basic background beliefs concerning matters of religion and theology, the proper role of government, and “human nature.”