Abstract
Historians have long treated the Algerian War in general and the May 1958 crisis in particular as domestic affairs. But newly open archives in France, the US, and Great Britain compel a reassesment of the rôle of outsiders. Beginning with the Suez crisis American officials used economic diplornacy to force a reduction in France 's war effort, fearing that an escalating conflict would cause North Africa to fall under communist or Nasserist influence. When border clashes with Tunisia threatened an expansion of the war Washington prepared an ultimatum demanding negotiations with the FLN. American coercion exacerbated civil- military relations and caused the Assembly to overturn the penultimate government of the Fourth Republic. Thus the chain of events that gave de Gaulle the power to end the war began with an American effort to compel France to conclude an early peace.
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