The Foundations of Agency - and Ethics?

Olof Leffler

doi:10.1007/s11406-016-9702-2

Abstract

In this article, I take off from some central issues in Paul Katsafanas’ recent book Agency and the Foundations of Ethics. I argue that Katsafanas’ alleged aims of action fail to do the work he requires them to do. First, his approach to activity or control is deeply problematic in the light of counterexamples. More importantly, the view of activity or control he needs to get his argument going is most likely false, as it requires our values to do work that they are too fickle to do. Second, I take issue with the Nietzschean drive psychology underlying the second agential aim, viz. power. I argue that ordinary desires better describe a number of phenomena that Katsafanas uses drives to explain, and that some actions can aim in the opposite direction. As only drive-motivated actions aim at power, action does not, therefore, constitutively aim at power. Finally, I sketch a Humean approach to constitutivism, and argue that it both explains the desiderata that Katsafanas posits as well as solves the problems for his view. The Humean view is preferable, and should be developed further.

Highlights

In this article, I take off from some central issues in Paul Katsafanas’ recent book Agency and the Foundations of Ethics
Constitutivism – roughly, the view that normative requirements or standards are based on the constitutive features of action or agency1 – has recently gained much ground
Paul Katsafanas has recently developed a version of constitutivism, in his book Agency and the Foundations of Ethics: Nietzschean Constitutivism (2013)

Summary

Introduction

I take off from some central issues in Paul Katsafanas’ recent book Agency and the Foundations of Ethics. Katsafanas’ case for a Nietzschean constitutivism includes arguing that action has two constitutive aims: Activity and Power.

Results

Conclusion