Abstract
ABSTRACT The aim of this article is to assess the strength of the normative claim of banning nuclear weapons, expressed by the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The first part shows that, in the Finnemore/Sikkink norm lifecycle, it is likely to be stuck at the first stage (emergence), as it does not meet the conditions for reaching the tipping point and therefore cascading (a critical mass of states; a mass of critical states; the intrinsic characteristics of the norm; how it fits in the existing normative framework). The second part shows that, in the three-part pattern of disarmament campaigns identified by Hanson, it is likely to be stuck at stage two, stigmatising and delegitimising nuclear weapons, but unable to eliminate them for three reasons (the exceptionality of nuclear weapons; the international security environment; and peer pressure). Overall, it will likely stay a forever-emerging norm.
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