The first image reversed: IGO signals and mass political attitudes

Abstract

This paper considers the argument that intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) send signals to the mass public, legitimizing certain policy options, and/or helping assure voters about the competence of the elected government. It discusses why the reception of IGO signals may be problematic within the mass public: many individuals lack the attention and knowledge to process them. And among those who are attentive and knowledgeable, pre-existing negative attitudes about IGOs may lead them to process the signal differently than intended. Using an experimental research design, it presents evidence consistent with an IGO signaling effect from two different scenarios. In an economic scenario, a negative signal from the World Trade Organization reduces support for the government’s economic policy. In a security scenario, a positive signal from the United Nations Security Council increases support for the government’s military policy. However, both IGO signals are conditional on certain individual-level attributes, and the IGO signal in the security scenario is generally stronger than in the economic scenario.