Abstract
Research in the “theory of the firm” tradition has often characterized firms as subeconomies, in which economic exchange is shaped by a central authority. We propose an expanded view of firms as subsocieties, in which authority is also responsible for establishing principles that shape cooperation among members. We draw on insights from political theory, sociology, and, to a lesser degree, legal theory to discuss how employees become members of subsocieties by exchanging rights, such as formal control over their work, for the benefits of membership. With this rights exchange, subsociety members develop expectations that those in positions of authority will use their control to define and sustain principles of justice and common purpose consistent with members’ moral sentiments. This view suggests expanded roles for authority and firm boundaries from what are incorporated into standard theories of the firm. These expanded roles have implications both for internal governance and for the boundary itself: When considering boundary changes, leaders must weigh both the economic and the social consequences of their decision. Funding: C. Gartenberg recognizes financial support from the Wharton School at University of Pennsylvania. T. Zenger recognizes the financial support of the Eccles School at the University of Utah.
Published Version
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