Abstract
RECENT European changes have accelerated and redirected the underlying forces in the Far East, making it important to understand the interplay of Orient and Occident in the period leading to the crisis of August-September I939. Perhaps the key question is, Why did Germany consent to the crippling of the Berlin-Tokyo alignment? The answer is to be found in the increasing complexity of the post-Munich world situation, the growing inadequacy of Japan as an instrument for the furtherance of German policy, and the conflict inherent in Germany's Far Eastern position. Beginning with the I930S Germany developed close economic relations with China, involving railway loans of Ch. $86 million in I934-I937, an important barter agreement in I936 for Chinese raw materials and German manufactures (including munitions), and a general increase in German-Chinese trade as a whole. Cultural relations were close, and a Reichswehr military mission (organized in I927-I929) was giving instructions to the Chinese army. At the same time, after the National Socialist victory in I933, German diplomacy required ever greater cooperation with Japan, the expanding power in Asia. This led to the German-Japanese AntiComintern Pact of November I936, a pledge for mutual cooperation against Communism, which was soon revealed as touching the interests of many countries besides Soviet Russia. With the outbreak of war between China and Japan in the summer of I937, Germany found it increasingly necessary to decide whether Japan's support in world affairs was more valuable than the Chinese market. The answer was delayed as long as possible. In November I937 a credit of ?2 million was extended to Manchukuo; yet from late October I937 through January I938 Germany attempted to mediate a peace. In February 1938, after mediation had failed, Hitler announced that Germany would recognize Man-
Published Version
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