Abstract

The actual issue of the Armenian-Russian relationship as mirrored through domestic power changes in Armenia after the «Velvet Revolution» in the spring of 2018, is raised and discussed in the paper through the event analysis as well as public perceptions. Despite the significantly increased level of negative perceptions and criticism from the broad strata of society, on June 20 of 2021, the same post-protest elites have been re-elected to the Armenian parliament and made up the majority. Accordingly, the political course of Armenia in the near future will remain unchanged, and its study, in particular, in the context of relations with the Russian Federation, is extremely relevant. We focus here on the role and image of the Armenian post-protest elites, including Armenian prime-minister N. Pashinyan, in maintaining/transforming the traditional Armenian-Russian strategic relations in the new conditions. Leaving aside the emotional component of the issue which has become a quite popular component of the public discourse in Armenian and Russian societies, the authors try to trace the reasons for the decline in trust in the Russian Federation as an ally in Armenian society before and after the «Velvet revolution» through the identification of deep, long-term factors and patterns. Besides, one of the main objectives of the study is to characterize the behavioral models and actions of Armenia’s post-protest elites associated with Armenian-Russian relations and creating an anti-Russian rather than the pro-Russian image of the post-protest elites in Armenia, including the image of prime minister Pashinyan. By identifying public perceptions in Armenia before and especially after the «Velvet Revolution» regarding the assessment of the effectiveness of Armenian-Russian relations and the role of post-protest elites in them, the authors, in particular, conclude that the perception of the positive image of the Russian Federation as an ally correlates with the negative image of Pashinyan and the factor of post-protest elites. On the other hand, the anti-Russian perceptions of a staidly widening group of the Armenian population are not always correlated with either positive or negative image or the factor of Pashinyan and have other, deeper roots.

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