Abstract
In 2011, we documented an extraordinary but usually overlooked fact: private antitrust enforcement deters a significant amount of anticompetitive conduct. Indeed the article showed that private enforcement probably deters even more anticompetitive conduct than the almost universally admired anticartel enforcement program of the United States Department of Justice. In a recent issue of The Antitrust Bulletin, Gregory J. Werden, Scott D. Hammond, and Belinda A. Barnett, members of the Justice Department staff, challenged our analysis, asserting that our comparison “is more misleading than informative.” However, their specific criticisms do not withstand scrutiny. In this reply, we explain why our original conclusions survive the efforts of Werden, Hammond, and Barnett to debunk them.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
