The Evolutionary Analysis of Agricultural Production Transaction Under The Price Subsidy Policy

Abstract

The scattered and small-scale production mode together with asymmetric business information results in the Chinese peasants' weak position in the agricultural supply chain. Chinese government has implemented some effective measures to safeguard the peasants' benefits. By establishing a tripartite evolutionary game model among the peasants, agricultural products dealers and government under the policy of price subsidy, the effects of social benefits, the size of the penalty and the transaction volume on the evolutionary stable strategy is discussed. A simulation instance is also given to demonstrate the evolutionary game model. The results shows that the probability of government regulation is not only related to the social benefits of regulation, but also affected by the transaction volume of agricultural products, the peasants benefits can be protected effectively by the price subsidy policy and the probability of the agricultural products dealers choosing fraud strategy declines with the increase of penalty and increases with the transaction volume of agricultural products.