Does blockchain-based traceability system guarantee information authenticity? An evolutionary game approach

Abstract

While blockchain-based traceability systems in agricultural product supply chains (APSCs) have the potential to improve operational efficiency and food safety, little literature examined the risk of traceability information being falsified before it is recorded on the blockchain. Therefore, using an evolutionary game model, this paper studies the potential falsification risk in the blockchain-based traceability system for agricultural products. The model focuses on the evolutionary path of two key stakeholders: farmers who may falsify information and blockchain platforms that may verify the authenticity of the information. Factors including government supervision and market demand are also considered. The results demonstrate that: (1) the evolutionary stable strategy of the game model depends on whether both stakeholders can benefit from information falsification after taking into account related costs and penalties; (2) when the purchasers' preference for product freshness and well-known places of origin is sufficiently high, farmers will consistently engage in the information falsification, with the platform allowing such behavior to persist; (3) if the downstream stakeholders attach importance to the authenticity of traceability information recorded on the blockchain, this will reduce farmers' willingness to falsify information and increase blockchain platforms’ willingness to verify authenticity; these two effects can lead to situations where the optimal evolutionary stable strategy exists. Based on the results, we discuss the details of blockchain-enabled audits to curb information falsification. The findings of this paper call attention to preventing falsification and developing guidelines for blockchain technology adoptions in APSCs.