The evolution of the relationship among stakeholders in port integration: Evidence from tripartite evolutionary game analysis

Abstract

The economies of scale produced by port integration have been demonstrated globally, as port managers and governments have gradually increased the degree of port integration in multi-port regions (MPRs) to promote economic efficiency. In the process of such integration, however, problems such as resource mismatch and a lack of coordination between ports frequently occur. In order to encourage voluntary integration and the transformation of competition among neighboring ports into an overall synergy that produces greater efficiency, it is necessary to explore the cooperative relationship between ports and the role of the government in the process of port integration. This paper adopts dynamic simulation methods to analyze the game relationship between relevant stakeholders, including both governments and port enterprises. The analysis follows the classical hypotheses of game theory, in which the players are rational and possess common knowledge. The results indicate that a reasonable profit allocation coefficient and compensation fee can promote advantageous development within a tripartite game system. In addition, this study suggests several government incentives for port integration, including the adjustment of the benefit allocation coefficient and the strengthening of policy rewards for port enterprises.