The evolution of strategic male mating effort in an information transfer framework.

Abstract

Sperm competition theory predicts that males should use cues indicating the risk and intensity of sperm competition to tailor their sperm investment accordingly. Rival males are an important source of social information regarding sperm competition risk. However, revealing such information may not be in the rival males' interest. Here, we use a theoretical approach based on informed and uninformed games to investigate when information transfer about sperm competition risk to competitors is beneficial for a male, and when it is not. The results show that signalling to potential future mates that a female has already mated is beneficial when the signalling male has a sperm competition disadvantage, whereas it is unfavourable when the signaller has an advantage. The reason for this counterintuitive result is that the rival males' optimal response is to reduce sperm investment when the signaller has a disadvantage and, conversely, to increase investment when the signaller has an advantage. Furthermore, we analysed scenarios where males use alternative reproductive tactics. In this situation, signalling the awareness of sperm competition risk rarely pays; instead, it is beneficial to maintain an information advantage. Thus, it may be beneficial for bourgeois males to accept cuckoldry instead of revealing their sperm competition awareness to reproductive parasites. These results provide new insight into the evolution of communication between rivals in the context of sperm competition.