The Euro-Arab Dialogue and the Limits of European External Intervention in the Middle East, 1974–77

Abstract

The Euro-Arab Dialogue (EAD) was established by the European Economic Community in 1974 as a way of improving bilateral relations between Europe and the Arab world in the wake of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the subsequent global energy crisis. This article examines the success of the EAD in its first three years in existence (between 1974 and 1977). It begins with an analysis of the literature on the framework in these years. Much of this material argues that the EAD was a success in achieving its goal of improving relations with the Arab world as well as evidence of the success of the recently established European Political Cooperation (EPC) framework in general. This article challenges this view and instead argues that the EAD, even in its early years, was not a success due to three factors: the first was the failure of the EEC to keep the EAD focused on economic issues and to prevent the politicization of the framework; the second was the Community's inability to come to grips with the deep internal divisions over both the mandate and goals of the EAD; and the third was American hostility towards the EAD from the time of its birth.