The beginning of the Euro-Arab Dialogue and the Trans-Atlantic relations (1973-1975)

Abstract

Despite the fact that attempts to make this type of collaboration permanent failed during the years which followed, the Euro-Arab Dialogue was a significant moment in the field of international relations and of the history of the European Community, especially analyzing the global scenario and the American opposition. Thought by the Quai d’Orsay to be an alternative strategy to the Washington deals during the 1973 oil crisis, it certainly represented an important attempt to develop an EC foreign policy that did not necessarily imply – as it turned out –incompatibility with the wishes of the White House. The purpose of this paper is to examine the development of the EAD and to compare it with the Trans-Atlantic dealings. Nevertheless, the typology and the methods of Washington opposition changed over time; in some circumstances Kissinger seemed to control the evolution of the EAD, pressing the Western European governments to confront and oppose the Arab intention to transform the dialogue into a base for political claims. This manuscript aims at investing the beginning of the EAD and the relations with the Trans-Atlantic limits and constraints, mainly using archival documents available at the Historical Archives of the European Union, at the National Archive, at the National Archives and Record Administration. There is not much literature about the EAD and this is mainly focused on the poor results. Beside the first academic works with a political science approach (i.e.: Al-Dajani, 1976; Allen, 1977; Taylor, 1978; Jawad, 1992), in the new articles the EAD is not always the main subject (i.e.: Miller, 2014; Mockli, 2009). Furthermore, Bat Ye’or (2005) attaches too much importance to the political issues, while Zakariah (2013) focuses its analysis on the ‘real’ attitude of the British policy towards the EAD.