Abstract

The following paper examines the envisaged framework and effectiveness of the triangulation of mechanisms currently planned at the EU level: the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), proceedings under Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) against Poland and Hungary, and the mechanism to protect EU’s budget in deficiencies withregards to the rule of law in Member States. This research focuses on the overall structure and powers of the EPPO with special attention on its role in investigating and prosecuting offences affecting to the EU’s financial interests. This includes active and passive corruption among others with particular emphasis on the expected interaction between the EPPO and the national authorities. However, not all EU Member States have joined the EPPO framework. Here the role of the EU institutions is analyzed in light of the recent developments in Article 7 TEU proceedings. A third possible mechanism to react to the growth of executive powers in some states and the corresponding imbalances is the EU Commission’s proposal for a mechanism on the protection of the EU’s budget in case of generalized deficiencies as regards the rule of law. This may include corruption or other breaches to the implementation of the Union budget.

Highlights

  • Article 2 Treaty on European Union (TEU) stipulates that the EU “is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities.” This language echoes a hierarchy of norms, embedded in what resembles a process of EU’s constitutionalization.1 The EU is a supranational order, shaped by common values and expectations, rules, procedures and clearly defined sanctions

  • The following paper examines the envisaged framework and effectiveness of the triangulation of mechanisms currently planned at the EU level: the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), proceedings under Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) against Poland and Hungary, and the mechanism to protect EU’s budget in deficiencies with regards to the rule of law in Member States

  • In case of authorization refusal, the handling EDP would withdraw the assignment. This begs the question whether the requested authorization by the assisting EDP is to be evaluated by the judicial authority in the assisting Member State in a matter which may “deny the authorisation of the measure on broader grounds than those foreseen in the EIO Directive.” 82 To some degree, Article 31(6) of the EPPO Regulation responds to the conundrum as it stipulates that the if the assigned measure does not exist in a purely domestic situation, “but would be available in a cross-border situation covered by legal instruments on mutual recognition or cross-border cooperation, the European Delegated Prosecutors concerned may, in agreement with the supervising European Prosecutors concerned, have recourse to such instruments.”

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Summary

Introduction

Article 2 TEU stipulates that the EU “is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities.” This language echoes a hierarchy of norms, embedded in what resembles a process of EU’s constitutionalization. The EU is a supranational order, shaped by common values and expectations, rules, procedures and clearly defined sanctions. Article 2 TEU stipulates that the EU “is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities.” This language echoes a hierarchy of norms, embedded in what resembles a process of EU’s constitutionalization.. Some problems are outlined as regards the potential suspensions of EU funds to the sanctioned state(s) In this manner, the paper aims to analyze three different but intersecting mechanisms: from the most intergovernmental Article 7 TEU proceedings through the more specific, criminal law-oriented EPPO that is soon to be functioning to the planned framework of the suspension of EU funds in cases of deficiencies of the rule of law. The focus of the analysis is on the structure of the Article 7

Response to the Challenges to the Rule of Law and Corruption
Material Competence of the EPPO
Structure of the EPPO
Judicial Review of the EPPO
Judicial Review at the EU Level
Findings
Conclusion

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