EUROPEAN PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE AND THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PARADIGM. SUPRANATIONAL ORGANIZATION OR DELEGATED INSTITUTION?

Abstract

The European Public Prosecutor's Office, a revolutionary novelty, has raised many issues and questions from the initial moment of the proposal of its creation in 2013 until now. Being a rather controversial topic, both among practitioners and theorists, the European Public Prosecutor's Office presents itself as an "unidentified flying object" among the European or national institutions of the EU Member States regarding the nature of this body, the way it works, the way of influencing the political decision and its competence, the corresponding policy, and the guiding governance, etc. Preventing and combating, investigating, and prosecuting crimes affecting the EU's financial interests is the core task of the European Public Prosecutor's Office. However, as we will see in this paper, the dynamics of globalization and the criminal phenomenon seem to hinder the proper functioning of this new body, the complexity of these crimes and causal links with phenomena such as terrorism, organized crime or trafficking of prohibited substances can influence the European Public Prosecutor's Office`s investigation and prosecution activities. This paper analyzes from an institutionalist perspective the emergence, evolution, and functioning, but especially the future perspective of this newly established body. Conceptually, the added value of the paper will be the political-legal analysis of how the European Public Prosecutor's Office was created, but also how it can actually work in relation to the national authorities and national law systems of the 27 Member States. Last but not least, this analysis wants to position the European Public Prosecutor's Office, together with other European bodies, agencies, and institutions, as a pillar in the European Union's path toward a possible future federalist scenario.