The EU from a constitutional project to a process of constitutionalization

Abstract

ABSTRACTTaking a longue durée approach to EU political legitimacy, the paper examines three successive constitutional models of European integration: the transnational political movement for a democratic federal constitution; the ‘constitutional moment’ of 2001–2005; and the European de facto constitutionalization through progressive treaty revision. The attempt to draft a Constitution for Europe showed the limits of supranational democracy in that it maintained the intergovernmental design of treaty revision, and finally crashed against the scepticism of a number of national voters. What is left is the mixed kind of legitimation that results from the successive treaty revisions: input legitimacy (through the European and the national parliaments, states’ governments representation in Council, social dialogue, and participatory democracy), output legitimacy, and rule of law. This mixed model is exactly what is now put into question. The multiple crises that the EU currently experiences seem open to three different developments: an unlikely new edition of the federal dream; the transformation of the EU into an ‘empire’ with one or more clear hegemonic countries; the reinforcement of informal, inclusive governance as a further implementation of the path inaugurated with the Lisbon Treaty. A mixed, but mainly intergovernmental strengthening of (economic) governance is still the most realistic path out of the crisis and towards enhanced political union.