The Ethics of Peace and War

This work constitutes a full analysis of Just War Theory in each of its aspects, representing a complete exposition of the corpus of International Law,Jus ad Bellum, and exploring Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict,Jus in Bello. This comprises the rules that should govern armed conflict, and is called humanitarian precisely because it aims at safeguarding humanitarian values and human rights in times of war. Consequently, this book covers the Law of War in its entirety, both theJus ad Bellumcategory – justifications of war – as well as theJus in Bellocategory. Extensively analyzed are the following aspects of the use of military force: Self-Defense in International Law, Humanitarian Intervention, National Liberation Wars, Pro-democracy intervention, United Nations Peacekeeping and Peace-enforcement action, Nuclear Weapons, Law of Armed Conflict - International Humanitarian Law, Illegal Use of Force and Statehood.

The end of the Cold War, and especially the 9/11 events brought back as a core subject for debates the Just War Theory as an answer for the new contemporary realities represented by aggressions, intervention, self‑defense, war prisoners, terrorists, war crimes, etc. JWT has always been understood not as an abstract moral theory but more as a practical guide for military and political leaders for their armed implication decisions. If JWT is adequate or not to the current conditions, it is closely connected to its ability to meet this practical function. The present article will analyze the degree to which the recent changes of the role of military violence affected JWT.

This article argues that using armed force in peace enforcement operations (PEO) need not be reserved for a Last Resort even while preserving the integrity of Just War theory. It aims to deepen the ethical discussion regarding the relevance of Last Resort as a consideration for the use of armed force, specifically in PEO. Armed force in such operations can interrupt barbarism or genocide and may even be utilized to preempt or prevent possible war. Using armed force in humanitarian interventions is not the moral equivalent of launching war, but the choice to enter such disputes must be subject to intense ethical scrutiny. Such operations are undertaken in an effort to prevent a bad situation from deteriorating. The ethical framework of Just War theory provides criteria for moral deliberation related to the use of military force in such actions. The possibility exists that applying armed force before reaching a point of Last Resort may be just in a humanitarian operation if it accompanies other efforts. Preemption remains an inherent part of US strategic thinking, while PEO are normally viewed as a preventive measure. 1 Persistent ethical questions regarding preemption are directly linked to Just War theory, particularly when it comes to the standard of war as a Last Resort. Analysis of this criterion generally follows the trend of categorizing war as a Last Resort based on the judgment that war is the worst prudential and moral option due to the associated death and civil destruction. Peace enforcement operations may be a higher moral option and perhaps even a moral duty. Strategic thinkers are challenged to probe these questions and provide insight in their efforts to strengthen the moral decisionmaking process.

Francisco de Vitoria (1483/1486 – 1546), a Spanish Dominican friar and the dean of the School of Salamanca, developed a comprehensive theory of just war. In this theory, he addressed ius ad bellum, ius in bello, and ius post bellum. His interpretations of ius in bello – the rules for waging a just war by a just side against an unjust side – are particularly useful, even to this day. This paper briefly analyzes these rules and the solid, yet heterogeneous arguments Vitoria used to prove their validity and correctness. Vitoria’s ius in bello corresponds to his understanding of a just war as the judgment of an unjust side by a just side for harm caused. Thus, it primarily regulates the conduct of the just side in an ongoing just war, giving it superiority over the unjust side. Conversely, it restricts the just side’s use of military force against the unjust side, a concept that is a precursor to the modern law of war.

Armed humanitarian intervention, or the use of military force to protect the fundamental human rights of the citizens of another state, has become increasingly prominent in debates about the role of ethics in international affairs. Ethical objections to such intervention focus on two issues in particular: the violation of national sovereignty and the use of armed force with the concomitant loss of life and human suffering entailed. Some proponents of humanitarian intervention argue that if intervention occurs in accordance with international law, its threat to both state sovereignty and human life will be minimized. However, the requirement of UN Security Council authorization has become increasingly difficult to satisfy. International humanitarian intervention to stop gross human rights abuses can perhaps be supported as the fulfilment of the just cause criterion of just war theory. The danger inherent in this sort of argument is that it implies a conflict between legality and morality that weakens the already precarious jurisdiction of international law. The anti-militarist or pacifist critique of armed humanitarian intervention, with its focus on a non-consequentialist approach to the value of human life and its concern with processes of militarization, provides a further normative challenge to armed humanitarian intervention.

: This monograph analyzes classical warfare and modern warfare to determine whether there is a theoretical shift occurring that is blending the tenets of both of these theories of war. Exploitation of the inherent strengths of each of these theories of warfare could lead to a more cogent form of warfare appropriate for the U.S. Army as it implements its current transformation. The use of military force, or the threat of military force, has been a dominant feature of societies from the most primitive to the highly advanced. Whether organized along primitive tribal groupings for use only during time of war, or whether organized from complex industrial societies as professional standing armies, all military forces have theoretical underpinnings. Without a coherent theory of war, it is impossible to employ organized military force in an effective fashion. The military force operating from the most effective and appropriate military theory has the greater chance of victory. The two most dominant theories of war for conventional forces are those of classical warfare, enumerated by decisive battle, and modern warfare aptly defined within the operational art. The use of the concept of tenets is most useful as the monograph defines decisive and operational warfare. The monograph must first explore the definition of classical warfare and decisive battle. The monograph develops a definition for decisive battle utilizing historical example and then determines the tenets that propagate the theory of classical warfare. Analyzing in detail the component parts or tenets of the theory of classical warfare determines the theoretical basis for how the militaries of the past conducted warfare either successfully or unsuccessfully. Next, the monograph defines operational war, identifies its basic tenets and provides historical examples of the conduct

Peace plays a central role in the ethics of war and peace, but this proves to be an enormous challenge. In a recent article, Elisabeth Forster and Isaac Taylor grapple with this important topic. They argue that certain concepts in just war theory—aggression, legitimacy, and peace—are essentially contested and susceptible to manipulation. Because the rules are interpreted and applied by the very states that wage war, it is as if the fox is asked to guard the chicken coop—a recipe for disaster. To avoid manipulation of the theory and make the goal of peace attainable, they defend “minimalism” in the ethics of war and peace. This paper responds to and builds on their article. After nuancing the analysis, I will argue (a) that their minimalism does not solve the problem since the proposed alternative concept is equally prone to misuse, and (b) that their minimalism is mistargeted. What I propose is to specify and ground the rules of war without raising the standard too high, to disentangle jus ad bellum and jus post bellum and see peace as guiding principle for jus post bellum, and to interpret that in a minimalist way.

Contents: Introduction, Richard Sorabji and David Rodin. Part I Traditions: Just war from ancient origins to the Conquistadors debate and its modern relevance, Richard Sorabji The just war of Eastern Christians and the holy war of the Crusaders, Angeliki Laiou Conceptions of justice in war: from Grotius to modern times, Karma Nabulsi Arguments concerning resistance in contemporary Islam, John Kelsay War and reason in Maimonides and Averroes, Noah Feldman The ethics of war: Judaism, Norman Solomon Just war in the Mahabharata, Nick Allen. Part II Contemporary Problems: The ethics of asymmetric war, David Rodin Preventive war and the killing of the innocent, Jeff McMahan War, humanitarian intervention and human rights, Richard Norman Culture, the enemy and the moral restraint of war, Anthony Coates Application of just war criteria in the period 1959-89, Richard Harries Britain's wars since 1945, Michael Quinlan Index.

Contents Preface Chapter 1: The Ethics of War and Peace: Preliminary Considerations Introduction What are War and Peace? Classifications in the Ethics of War Approaches to the Ethics of International Relations The Three Traditional Approaches to the Ethics of War Cosmopolitan Approaches Two further Considerations concerning the Nature of Ethical Analysis Survey of War/Peace Issues in the Modern Era The Plan for the Rest of the Book Chapter 2: Realism and Militarism The Realist View of War Sources of the Realist Approach Militarism Critique of Realism Critique of Militarism Chapter 3: Internationalism and Cosmopolitanism Internationalism Cosmopolitanism Cosmopolitanism and Internationalism: some Contrasts Further Considerations: Justifications of Internationalism Further Considerations: Justifications of Cosmopolitanism Chapter 4: The Justification of War Just War and Tradition Ius ad Bellum: more detailed Analysis and Justifications What are the Issues raised by Ius in Bello? A Note on Internationalism and Cosmopolitanism Objections Chapter 5: Pacifism, Nonviolence and the Way of Peace Introduction Nonviolence Pacifism The Way of Peace Chapter 6: Peace and Pacificism Peace Pacificism Criticisms of Pacificism Chapter 7: Modern Issues Nuclear War and Deterrence Contemporary Wars Terrorism Humanitarian Intervention Security and Human Security Conclusion The Main Goals of the Book Religion, War and Peace The Future Bibliography

Introduction. I. THE JUST WAR TRADITION. 1. The Just War in Antiquity. 2. Christianity and the Just War. 3. Saint Augustine and the Tradition of Just War. 4. Secularization of the Just War Tradition. II. THE LEGAL POSITION OF WAR. 5. Hugo Grotius: Father of International Law. 6. Hugo Grotius and the Just War. 7. Problems for International Law. III. MORAL ISSUES IN WAR. 8. The Responsibility for War Crimes. 9. Military Necessity. 10. Reprisals. 11. Terrorism and War. 12. The Just War and Weapons of Mass Destruction. IV. PROFESSIONAL AND HUMANITARIAN OBLIGATIONS. 13. The Military as a Profession. 14. Unjust Wars and Professional Responsibility. 15. The Role of the United Nations. Glossary. Selected Bibliography. Index.

In the middle of the 1990s the concept of human security is introduced as a reflection of general change of the stress from the military state‑centric issues (assumed by the realist and neo‑realist orthodoxism) towards those non‑military. This new narrative consists in the transformation of the individual into the reference object of security, due to the fact that, under the pressure of globalization, the state is moved away (at least partially) from the epicenter of policy making. So, the concept of security is extended from the security of the nations to the security of the individuals, from the nation to the international system, is extending by supplementing the military perspective with the political, economic and environmental ones and thus, the range of security can basically receive human dimension. By the mechanisms and the normative principles of such a perspective it is possible to identify some important arguments that human security can be fundamental in the justification of the ethics of interventions and by by‑passing the state to offer the ultimate argument for just war theory (used to address the moral and legal aspects linked with the use of military force).

Generally speaking, just war theory (JWT) holds that there are two just causes for war: self‐defence and ‘other‐defence’. The most common type of the latter is popularly known as ‘humanitarian intervention’. There is debate, however, as to whether these can serve as just causes for preventive war. Those who subscribe to JWT tend to be unified in treating so‐called preventive war with a high degree of suspicion on the grounds that it fails to satisfy conventional criteria for jus ad bello; – particularly the just cause and last resort criteria. Francisco di Vitoria held that the only just cause for war was ‘a wrong received’, which renders impossible any justification for preventive war. There are assumptions implicit in recent military practice, however – most notably, the US‐led invasion of Iraq in 2003 – that challenge this ban on preventive war.Interestingly, both supporters and critics attempt to justify their views through the broader logic of JWT; viz., through a conception of what is good for both political communities and individuals, and through a legitimate defence of these goods. Supporters point to situations where so‐called rogue states represent ‘grave and imminent risk’ of committing acts of aggression as grounds that justify preventive war; critics argue that to attack another political community on the basis of crimes not yet committed is a breach of the very rights JWT was created to defend.The advocate of preventive war does not appreciate important aspects concerning the morality of war. In the ongoing tension between Iran and The United States and her allies – if the rhetoric is to be believed – I am asked to tolerate a threat to my security and liberty, and to risk suffering aggression in defence of the rights of the antagonistic, but not yet aggressive, state. The crucial question is how such tolerance and risk fit in with the logic of just war: at what point, if any, does the risk of being attacked become great enough to justify declaring war in anticipation?In this paper I highlight some of the theoretical and practical difficulties in determining what counts as a grave and imminent threat, focusing especially on the complicated case of ‘imminence’ in the face of so‐called ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’. Secondly, I will argue that not only is the notion of preventive war inconsistent with the defence of the rights of political communities that JWT requires; it is also forbidden by the proportionality requirement of jus ad bellum. A risk of being subjected to aggression is the price for global peace. Whilst political communities can do much to prevent aggression and prepare themselves in case it occurs, the conditions for just war require that this prevention and preparation stop short of declaring war. We must live with a certain degree of risk in this area.

Michael Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars remains the standard account of just war theory despite the criticism it has received. Much of that criticism denies the political character of just war discourse by substituting general moral principles for principles generated in reflecting on the use of military force. It challenges Walzer’s view of the relationship between morality and politics and his conclusions about the moral standing of states, the moral equality of soldiers, the moral basis of humanitarian intervention, and the limits of morality in emergencies. Instead of providing a foundational argument, the book reconstructs a tradition of discourse that transcends particular contexts because of the range of historical experience on which it draws. The critics raise genuine issues but their objections do not undermine the book’s argument. That argument stands in a complex relationship with political realism, which it rejects in some ways and embraces in others.

Saint Augustine, being seen as one of the first just war theorists, famously stated that the true object of war is peace.¹And while just war theory is often said to be the leading position on the morality of war, today, it is struggling to keep up with the changing international reality. It is premised upon a certain conception of war - as armed conflict between two states - and on a clear demarcation line between the situation of war and the situation of peace. This however, seems to no longer fit the political reality. More often than not, we find ourselves in a grey area. This ‘new’ political reality, the changed character of war(fare), and the often blurry boundaries between war and peace, pose serious challenges to just war theory. This paper analyzes one solution: an extension of the bipartite conception of the theory. A branch called jus ante bellum, preventive peacemaking, is sometimes suggested to precede jus ad bellum. And jus post bellum, justice after the war, is the welcomed branch that could provide post war guidance. This paper explores what it means to adopt these branches. What does it bring us to extend the theory? It is presumed that it would benefit the goal of just war theory, that Augustine already pointed at: limiting war and realizing a ‘just and durable peace’. But is an extension really a good idea? There are several reasons why we should be careful to regard these arguably important issues within the parameters of just war theory.

THE JUST-WAR DOCTRINE: A WARRANT FOR RESISTANCE I INTRODUCTION IN THE COURSE of its history the just-war theory, with its va.rious criteria, h~s seeme~ ~esign~d to fulfill different funct10ns. Although it was origmally mtended as a means of securing and maintaining peace through the imposition of limits upon recourse to war and the establishment of restrictions in its conduct, nations at times have turned to the doctrine of the just war to legitimize the use of military force as a Christian institution. It has further been suggested that another function of the just-war theory is to aid individual citizens in reaching a decision regarding their personal participation in war. It is this last suggested function of the just-war doctrine that is the focus of this essay. During the late sixties and early seventies many Americans refused cooperation with the nation's involvement in Southeast Asia; a good number of Americans were even drawn into active resistance against the government's efforts to secure people's participation in the military enterprise. To the extent that the activity of the resisters was a matter of conscience, it was testimony to the fact that the responsibility of individual citizens who are ordered by civil authorities to participate in war cannot simply be abdicated. The activity of resistance was a living protest that each person must concern himself with the question of a war's justice before he allows himself to become engaged in it. Implied in this protest, it seems, is the belief that the justice or injustice of any war can in fact be discerned by the individual, and thus that it is not sufficient to expect a person's commitment to a war solely because the competent authorities call for participation. This essay at503 504 VINCENT J. GENOVESI, S. J. tempts to relate this line of argumentation and its implications to the tradition of Christian reflection on war as it developed through the centuries. How are these ideas rooted in the tradition , and to what extent are they the result of new experiences and insights? The key question, as suggested by Paul Ramsey and also by Ralph Potter, is how seriously should we take the fact that the guidelines of the just-war doctrine are intended not only for the consideration of public authorities in their decisions concerning resort to war and the manner of its conduct, but are meant also as criteria to be applied by individual citizens as a means of determining the legitimacy of their own participation in a war.1 What makes this question so important is the fact that the history of the just-war theory seems never to affirm explicitly that the doctrine includes private citizens within its intended audience. II SCRIPTURAL BACKGROUND The Old Testament offers little information which would enable us to draw definite conclusions concerning the individual 's right to refuse participation in war, but it seems possible to indicate two patterns of thought which, if expanded, might have some bearing on the question at issue. First of all, at least until the time of the monarchy, war was viewed by the Israelite tribes as a holy war, a war of Yahweh, and participation in that war was seen as the execution of his anger (Ex. 17: 16; Nm. 21: 14; 1 Sm. 25: 28) . The call to war was made by a charismatic leader upon whom the spirit of Yahweh had come and it is clear that emphasis is put on the fact that the initiative lay wholly with Yahweh. Prior to engagement in battle, inquiry was made concerning Yahweh's will and whatever he commanded was considered just. Within this framework involving the authority of Yahweh and his direct command to 1 Paul Ramsey, War and the Christian Conscience, (Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 1961), p. ms; also Ralph Potter, "Conscientious Objection To Particular Wars," in Religion and the Public Order, 4, 1966 ed. by Donald A. Giannella (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1968), 44-99 at 69. THE JUST-WAR DOCTRINE AND RESISTANCE 505 fight, there would appear to be no room for individual resistance to participation in the war. But it seems likely...