Abstract
The property of equal collective gains means that each player should obtain the same benefit from the cooperation of the other players in the game. We show that this property jointly with efficiency characterize a new solution, called the equal collective gains value (ECG-value). We introduce a new class of games, the average productivity games, for which the ECG-value is an imputation. For a better understanding of the new value, we also provide four alternative characterizations of it, and a negotiation model that supports it in subgame perfect equilibrium.
Highlights
In a cooperative game, the main challenge is to find an acceptable rule to reward players with the benefits of their cooperation
We consider the case of cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games)
For question (I), we show the existence of a new solution satisfying such requirements
Summary
The main challenge is to find an acceptable rule to reward players with the benefits of their cooperation. Each rule can be supported either as the non cooperative equilibrium of a plausible bargaining game or as the consequence of accepting some desirable properties that the rule should satisfy. Both have been called the strategic approach and the axiomatic approach respectively. One of the most remarkable proposals is that of Shapley (1953). Shapley shows that properties that characterize his rule are efficiency (players’ rewards cover the total value of the game), the null player property
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