6 - Cross-border resource management: methods

Abstract

This chapter introduces various methods on the optimal, fair or acceptable divisions of territories (or any other territorial-related resources) among claimants, which include, in addition to existing conventional geometric methods, the divider–chooser method, the lone divider method, the lone chooser method, the last diminisher method, the method of sealed bids and the method of markers. In the meantime, cooperative and noncooperative games are also developed so as to evaluate or optimise various cross-border behaviours. Usually, cooperative games are also win-win games, whereas noncooperative games are not. However, the cooperative games sometimes may evolve into noncooperative games; and the noncooperative games may lead to lose-lose outcomes for all players concerned. At the end of this chapter, a three-player, noncooperative game is constructed for policymakers to handle the South China Sea disputes, from which the conditions for a mutual deterrence (subgame perfect) equilibrium are derived for each player.