Abstract
An important question for manufacturers relates to how to conduct exchanges with suppliers when the interaction is done in an uncertain environment. Existing literature suggests the use of unilateral control (i.e., vertical control over the supplier) to reduce the negative effects of environmental uncertainty, whereas recent research on relational norms suggests bilateral control mechanisms (i.e., the norm of information sharing) as an alternative. We propose that in order to secure satisfactory performance from suppliers, manufacturers rely on different control mechanisms depending upon the level of environmental uncertainty on one hand, and the nature of interdependence in the manufacturer–supplier relationship on the other. Our empirical results based on 162 manufacturers indicate the following: 1) manufacturers' reliance on vertical control increases as environmental uncertainty and power asymmetry increase; 2) by contrast, reliance on the bilateral information sharing increases as interdependence magnitude increases and as environmental uncertainty decreases; 3) suppliers' performance, as perceived by manufacturers, increases with the use of bilateral information sharing.
Published Version
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have