THE END OF ENCLAVES

Abstract

In reply to Benson’s response, I agree that we should be seeking the dissolution of all enclaves in philosophy of religion—whether continental or analytic. But I continue to suggest that continental philosophy of religion bears special burdens in this respect. I consider Bruce Ellis Benson to be an ally in the project of fostering a “healthy” continental philosophy of religion and so welcome his response. Indeed, given that many in the mainstream of philosophy of religion might be either skeptical or suspicious about the very project—seeing this exchange as an exercise in re-arranging the deck chairs on the S.S. Mickey Mouse—it’s important to emphasize that we share the conviction that philosophical sources emerging from the phenomenological and hermeneutic traditions have much to contribute to philosophical reflection on faith. So I appreciate that he’s taken my “talking points” in the spirit they were offered: as conversation starters. Let me just briefly continue that conversation and then leave it for others to take up elsewhere. Without any pretention to being comprehensive, I’ll respond on just a few points. A. First, regarding the importance of a “pluralist” philosophical formation: While I don’t think the ground for my concern was only autobiographical, I’ll concede that my own philosophical formation is probably hovering in the background (though my doctoral work included training in “analytic” bioethics and early modern philosophy). And Benson is undoubtedly right to point out that many departments which are friendly to continental philosophy, including many at Catholic universities, also include solid resources in both analytic philosophy and the history of philosophy (Fordham, Georgetown, and Boston College immediately come to mind, for instance). 1 So I agree there are rich opportunities for emerging scholars interested in continental philosophy of religion to pursue graduate study in such pluralistic contexts, enabling them to become