Continental Philosophy of Religion

Abstract

This chapter proceeds much like the preceding chapter. Its goal is therefore that of substantiating more fully the claims made about continental philosophy of religion in Chapter 1, claims that are strangely similar to those made about analytic philosophy of religion: continental philosophy of religion tends (1) to neglect the historical religions of the world, (2) to lack diversity among the inquiring community, (3) to read the historical religions without thick and critical hermeneutical sensitivity, (4) to fail to engage in formal interreligious comparison, and (5) to evaluate its objects of inquiry too narrowly.1 As in the case of analytic philosophy of religion, my evidence for this tendency comes primarily from the three essay collections that I previewed in Chapter 1: Philip Goodchild’s Rethinking Philosophy of Religion (RPR), Patrick Maxwell and Deane-Peter Baker’s Explorations in Contemporary Continental Philosophy of Religion (ECCPR), and Eugene Long’s sixtieth volume of the International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (IJPR). But as in the case of analytic philosophy of religion, my arguments are also informed by (1) additional essay collections in continental philosophy of religion,2 (2) works recognized as seminal in continental philosophy of religion,3 (3) recent contributions to continental philosophy of religion in philosophy of religion journals,4 (4) histories of philosophy of religion in general,5 and (5) a 2011 conference on the future of continental philosophy of religion.6