The End of a Cycle: Australian and Portuguese Foreign Policies and the Fate of East Timor

Abstract

Before 30 August 1999, East Tim or had been for a long time an unfinished issue on international agenda. This situation resulted from Indonesia's decision in December 1975 to proceed with a military and political incorporation without an act of self-determination recognized by Portugal and United Nations. In different ways, during past twenty-five years foreign policies of Australia and Portugal had to deal domestically and internationally with Indonesian fait accompli. As time went by, it became clear that the question of East would only disappear with end of Indonesian authoritarian regime itself. On 27 January 1999, President B.J. Habibie opened a political window of opportunity, when he decided to allow a popular consultation in East Timor. Canberra and Lisbon could finally correct mistakes committed in past. Introduction The reference by former Indonesian Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, to East Timor as a pebble in Jakarta's shoe is -- despite fact that Alatas did not realize size of pebble -- also a good metaphor for diplomacies of both Australia and Portugal on this issue. For twenty-five years, question of East Timor would resurface from time to time and remind politicians in both countries of their responsibilities in Indonesian annexation. In Australia, issue was more divisive. The primacy given to closer economic and security relations with Indonesia implied a clash between policies adopted by politicians, constrained by a realist assessment of national interests, and views held by many among public at large, influenced as they were by their perception of national values. In Portugal, East Timor would remind politicians how Lisbon had been no help when assistance was most needed. In order to overcome national feelings of guilt and shame -- and without any real economic or political interest in relations with Indonesia -- Portugal pursued a policy of international activism in favour of right of East Timorese to self-determination. Each human rights violation committed by Indonesian military only strengthened further views of Portuguese politicians and public opinion on this matter. After initial decisions taken between 1974 and 1976 by Australia and Portugal, there was no turning back. Australia had to accept de facto and then de jure incorporation of East Timor as a province of Indonesia, and Portugal had to keep advocating East Timor's right to self-determination. Without losing face or damaging their respective national interests, only option available to each country was to wait until a window of opportunity would present a chance to overcome stalemate. This opportunity came only with regime change in Indonesia itself. This article will review cycle of Australian and Portuguese foreign policies related to question of East Timor. It begins with a description of what is called here Portuguese long wait and Australian long sore. It then takes into account end of stalemate and diplomatic shifts that occurred since new Indonesian President, Bachuriddin Jusuf Habibie, took office on 21 May 1998. [1] Portugal and East Timor: The Long Wait There were two steps in Portuguese approach to East Timor. First, Portugal made political efforts to accommodate demands of East Timorese for self-determination, while recognizing Indonesia's national interests. This occurred between Portuguese democratic transition in April 1974 and Indonesia's full-scale military invasion of East Timor on 7 December 1975. Secondly, after failure of first strategy, and in order to reverse Indonesian fait accompli, Portugal aimed to keep question politically alive and to raise as far as possible political costs to Jakarta of East Timor's incorporation. The achievement of final goal was to wait until appearance of a political window of opportunity, which could possibly allow an irreversible act of self-determination. …