The Electrification of Russia, 1880–1926 by Jonathan Coopersmith

Abstract

technologyand culture Book Reviews 413 cobalt deposits, crucible manufacturing, papermaking, winter forage plants, beekeeping, and ploughs. The reader tentatively concludes from these case studies that the society had an appreciable, if generally incremental, impact on “arts, manufactures, and commerce” in Britain, its colonies, and a few foreign nations. No doubt there are other interesting case studies that might profitably be pursued by historians of technology, and the society’s archives in London await further exploration. The book has been attractively printed and illustrated and contains a general introduction, a chronology, and introductions to each section by the editors, D. G. C. Allan and John L. Abbott. The presumable rationale for publishing a volume of previously published essays is the convenience of gathering them into one place and having them properly indexed. Unfortunately, “The Virtuoso Tribe’is indexed only by proper names. David Rhees Dr. Rhees, formerly assistant librarian for research and programs at the American Philosophical Society, is now executive director of the Bakken Library and Museum in Minneapolis. The Electrification of Russia, 1880-1926. By Jonathan Coopersmith. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992. Pp. xii+274; illustrations, tables, notes, index. $39.95. That Russia did not share the same pattern of economic development as western Europe and North America is an oft-repeated truism. It may come as a surprise to many, though, that even such a basic constituent process ofindustrialization as electrification acquired a distinctly different character in Russia, both under the tsars and during the Soviet period. Beginning his story in 1880, Jonathan Coopersmith reminds us that, while Russians did not invent the lightbulb, a Russian—PavelJablochkov— did invent the arc lamp. However, the fact that he could find commercial success only in western Europe (but not in his homeland) was broadly indicative of the array of structural obstacles that the state-shackled Russian economy posed to technological innovation. As with the intro­ duction of so many other large-scale technologies in Russia, electrifica­ tion was first promoted by the military, which remained the major source of demand for electric power through the 1880s. As the author explains, this was part of a larger pattern of weak urbanization, absence ofrailroads and other infrastructure, interministerial infighting, bureau­ cratic delays, a capital shortage, and already underfinanced local urban administrations unwilling to add to their debt. Coopersmith’s Russian case departs from Thomas Hughes’s standard account of electrification based on the experiences of the United States and selected countries of central and western Europe, which posits a 414 Book Reviews TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE natural, almost determinist pattern of invention and commercial appli­ cation. For, when Russia ultimately did begin to electrify, it was almost wholly reliant not only on foreign financing but on foreign technology and management as well. The German firm Siemens-Halske, for ex­ ample, had a controlling interest in the 1886 Company, Russia’s largest electric power supplier. Another major point of divergence was the absence of a national power network with uniform voltage and frequency standards, owing to Russia’s relative underdevelopment and great size. This permitted a proliferation of small, local power plants that generated direct current, cheaper than alternating current in the absence of big transmission lines and volume production of power. One extreme example of this incoherence was the parceling out of power supply in Saint Petersburg essentially to three monopolies, each of which supplied a different part of the city with a different voltage and frequency. Of course, Russia had no monopoly on technological incoherence. In New York City the IND and IRT subway franchises built entire networks using incompatible track gauges. The same thing happened in London as well, which should tell us something about the limits of Russian exceptionalism. It took a world war to get the tsarist power to see the necessity of fostering an integrated power network based on indigenous technology and secure sources of fuel, especially hydropower; when German ownership became untenable during World War I, the Russian state assumed a control it never relinquished. To some, electricity became the key to a utopian future. Among the leading young electrical engineers were those—such as Petr G. Smidovich, Leonid Krasin, Robert Klasson, and Gleb Kzhizhanovskii...