“Projects of the Century” in Soviet History: Large-Scale Technologies from Lenin to Gorbachev

Abstract

“Projects of the Century” in Soviet History: Large-Scale Technologies from Lenin to Gorbachev PAUL R. JOSEPHSON The Soviet Union embraced large-scale technologies with an en­ ergy that belied its economic backwardness. Its leaders saw technol­ ogy as a means to convert this largely agarian, peasant society into a well-oiled machine of workers dedicated to the construction of com­ munism. They believed large-scale technologies would marshal scarce resources efficiently and provide the appropriate forum for the politi­ cal and cultural education of a burgeoning working class. Constructiv­ ist visions of the communist future found expression in Lenin’s elec­ trification, Stalin’s canals and hydropower stations, Khrushchev’s atomic energy, and Brezhnev’s Siberian river diversion project. There were glorious chapters in the history of large-scale technology in the USSR, including the pioneering conquests of the atom and the cosmos. The Soviet fascination with technology as a panacea for social and economic problems mirrors that in the West. The Dutch reclaimed land from the ocean; England, France, Germany, Japan, and in par­ ticular the United States embraced large-scale technologies with the support of government, scientists, engineers, and often the public. The technologies represent a response to large-scale problems with the moral and economic criteria to provide goods and services to the masses. The decisions to go forward have implications for capital investment, manpower, and politics, and suggest that it is often easier to fund such resource-absorbing, large-scale systems than social pro­ grams. Dr. Josephson would like to thank Hikon Andersen, Tom Hughes, Roe Smith, John Staudenmaier, and the Technology and Culture referees for their comments on earlier drafts of the article; his students at Sarah Lawrence College for studying largescale technologies with him; and the National Endowment for the Humanities, the International Research and Exchanges Board, the Fulbright-Hays Faculty Research Program, the Dibner Institute, and the National Council for Soviet and East European Research for support of the research leading to this article.© 1995 by the Society for the History of Technology. All rights reserved. 0040-165X/95/3603-0005$01.00 519 520 Paul R. Josephson Yet socioeconomic and political desiderata shape the style of largescale technologies. Hence, in a number of ways, the Soviet Union differs from other nations. First, Marxism, which in its Soviet form was particularly technicist, serves as a state-sponsored ideology to reinforce almost unbounded faith in science and technology. Second, the Soviet system prevented public access to the policy process. Deci­ sion making was open only to selected party officials, economic plan­ ners, and scientists and engineers. Dissent, whistle-blowing, and other aspects of an engineering culture were muted until the postChernobyl years of glasnost, as was public opposition. Efforts to slow the diffusion of large-scale technologies had to come from within the scientific and engineering communities. Scientists and engineers trained within any cultural milieu are less than likely to question the system that molded them. This is particularly true of Soviet society, where strict controls on education, R&D, and the media created a legion of engineers who rarely questioned the efficacy, utility, or safety of their achievements. Indeed, the extent to which the state served as prime mover also distinguishes Soviet from Western techno­ logical development. Third, the style of Soviet technologies was characterized by an aes­ thetics based on two concerns: an exaggerated interest in mass pro­ duction owing both to egalitarian ideological precepts and resource scarcities that was accompanied by premature fixing of parameters, and the gigantomania that grew out of the fascination and commit­ ment to a technology of display. On the surface, some of these charac­ teristics are reminiscent of the Bauhaus and Fordism, with their aes­ thetics based on standardization, rationalization, and mass production of components. But the characteristics conspired with political forces to create a style noteworthy for bland, functional designs in which safety and comfort played a secondary role and environmental issues were rarely a concern. Standardization also contributed to the lack of accountability by engineers. Put simply, Marxist, economically determinist faith in technology, centralized bureaucratic political and economic structures, fear of innovation, and lack of effective political and economic opposition combined to impart great technological...