The Egalitarian Case Against Brundtland's Sustainability

Abstract

At the heart of any concept of sustainable development lies an idea of intergenerational justice. The latter can be understood in various ways, depending on the general theory of justice one considers most defensible. The author spells out six possible philosophical views on the matter. He shows the extent to which differences in logic also translate as significant differences in the intergenerational principles to be followed, using notions of savings and dissavings. Special attention is being paid to two reasons why the directives of a luck egalitarian theory of intergenerational justice do not necessarily coincide with Brundtland's view on intergenerational justice. Such differences become clear once we understand that, as a matter of principle, luck egalitarians should oppose not only generational dissavings, but also generational savings, hence stick to a strict "neither less, nor more" rule.