Can Luck Egalitarianism Serve as a Basis for Distributive Justice? A Critique of Kok-Chor Tan’s Institutional Luck Egalitarianism

Abstract

This paper examines whether Kok-Chor Tan’s institutional luck egalitarianism is successful as a pluralist luck egalitarian theory of justice and morality. In recent years, pluralist luck egalitarianism has become a salient theory of justice. Tan’s pluralist proposal for institutional luck egalitarianism is attractive because it seems to refute the metaphysical and practical challenges against luck egalitarianism. This paper demonstrates that, although Tan’s institutional luck egalitarianism is indeed a most sophisticated systematic pluralist theory of justice and morality, his argument fails because the application of luck egalitarianism to the domain of distributive justice and to the basic institutions of society is not justified from the luck egalitarian point of view. This paper concludes that Tan’s institutional luck egalitarianism does not succeed in demonstrating that his theory is an outstanding achievement of luck egalitarianism.