Abstract
AbstractThis study experimentally investigates how repeatedly‐induced exogenous happiness and anger affect the dynamics of cooperation and punishment in a public good game with repeated trials, wherein costly punishment is available and stranger matching is used. The study finds that induced happiness may harm cooperation when the reactions of the punished are also considered. Indeed, contributions in the happiness treatment decay with each round, while those in the anger treatment are stable. The main reason for this is found to be that the antisocial‐punished cooperators in the happiness treatment reduce their contributions, while those in the anger treatment do not.
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