Abstract
We study the co-evolutionary emergence of fairness preferences in the form of other-regarding behavior and its effect on the origination of costly punishment behavior in public good games. Our approach closely combines empirical results from three experiments with an evolutionary simulation model. In this way, we try to fill a gap between the evolutionary theoretical literature on cooperation and punishment on the one hand and the empirical findings from experimental economics on the other hand. As a principal result, we show that the evolution among interacting agents inevitably favors a sense for fairness in the form of “disadvantageous inequity aversion”. The evolutionary dominance and stability of disadvantageous inequity aversion is demonstrated by enabling agents to co-evolve with different self- and other-regarding preferences in a competitive environment with limited resources. Disadvantageous inequity aversion leads to the emergence of costly (“altruistic”) punishment behavior and quantitatively explains the level of punishment observed in contemporary lab experiments performed on subjects with a western culture. Our findings corroborate, complement, and interlink the experimental and theoretical literature that has shown the importance of other-regarding behavior in various decision settings.
Highlights
Why do we show other-regarding or even altruistic behaviors? Why and how did we develop a sense for fairness? Is such behavior compatible with Darwin’s principle of fitness maximization and/or with the economic axiom of rational decision making? Which evolutionary mechanisms dominate the evolution of our prosociality? This article aims at shedding light on the puzzling behavior of pro-sociality
The paper presents an approach to explain the emergence of fairness preferences and costly punishment behavior, which is motivated by perspectives from biology, evolutionary psychology, sociology and economics
1 Design from public goods game experiments We develop a simulation model consisting of synthetic agents that describes the long-term co-evolution of cultural norms and genes accounting for fairness preferences and costly punishment behavior in populations being exposed to a competitive voluntary contribution dilemma
Summary
Why do we show other-regarding or even altruistic behaviors? Why and how did we develop a sense for fairness? Is such behavior compatible with Darwin’s principle of fitness maximization and/or with the economic axiom of rational decision making? Which evolutionary mechanisms dominate the evolution of our prosociality? This article aims at shedding light on the puzzling behavior of pro-sociality. The paper presents an approach to explain the emergence of fairness preferences and costly punishment behavior, which is motivated by perspectives from biology, evolutionary psychology, sociology and economics. The importance of our genetic heritage for the structural basis of our pro-sociality appears to be plausible: Our genes encode the essential protein and RNA structures that are required to build up our physical-, cognitive- and computational capabilities. These capabilities allow us e.g. to perceive others’ behavior, to compare quantities and to interact either physically or by communication with our environment. They build the fundamental basis that allows us to express, transmit and externalize our cumulative knowledge, our culture
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