The effects of carbon pricing instruments on carbon emission reduction in China's refining industry: an evolutionary game between heterogeneous refineries.

Abstract

Carbon emissions from the refining industry are receiving increasing national attention. In view of long-term sustainable development, a carbon pricing mechanism oriented to carbon emission reduction needs to be developed. Currently, the two most common carbon pricing instruments are emission trading system and carbon tax. Therefore, it is important to study the carbon emission problems in the refining industry under emission trading system or carbon tax. Based on the current situation of China's refining industry, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model for backward and advanced refineries to explore which instrument is more effectively applied in the refining industry and identify the effective factors that can promote carbon emission reduction in refineries. According to the numerical results, if the heterogeneity of enterprises is small, the government's implementation of an emission trading system is the most effective measure, while carbon tax can only ensure that the equilibrium strategy solution is (1,1) when the tax rate is high. If the heterogeneity is large, the carbon tax policy will not have any effect, indicating that government implementation of an emission trading system is more effective than the carbon tax. In addition, there is a positive relationship between carbon price, carbon tax, and refineries' agreement to carbon emission reduction. Finally, consumers' preference for low-carbon products, R&D investment level, and R&D spillover effect have nothing to do with carbon emission reduction. Only by reducing refinery heterogeneity and improving the R&D efficiency of backward refineries can all enterprises agree to carbon emission reduction.