Abstract

Based on field research into the effects of a cabinet shuffle on a “global education” development project in Jordan, this paper contributes to emerging theory on the effects of unstable governance patterns on development programs. What literature exists on the contexts and effects of cabinet shuffles has tended to focus on the experiences of “Western” parliamentary democracies; a handful of case studies, however, have highlighted the implications of cabinet shuffles and government turnovers for international development projects. International research on the effects of government turnovers suggests that providing a legislative basis for development programs helps to shelter projects from instabilities in governance, although slowing project execution. By contrast, the case study of Jordan indicates that legislation is less a factor than the level of implementation: reforms that took place at the grassroots, school, and departmental levels were more resilient than reforms at the ministerial level. Thus, t...

Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call