The Effectiveness Analysis of the Supervision from Government on Control the Quality Behavior Risks of Enterprises in the Construction Industry

Abstract

The quality behavior risks aroused by the opportunistic behavior of enterprises have a significant impact on the overall quality of construction industry projects. This also presents a challenge for quality supervision from the government. The dynamic evolution of the selection of strategy between government supervisors and enterprises is studied in this paper. The evolutionary game model between government supervisors and enterprises is constructed. Based on system dynamics theory, the evolutionary process on the supervision from the government to control the quality behavior risks is then simulated. The reasons for deviation of quality behavior aroused by enterprises are explained by the prospect theory. The results show that there is no stable point in the risk control system of the quality behavior. Since the fluctuations happen during the evolutionary game process, the system finally evolves to the strategy of government adopting negative supervision and participants not adopting opportunistic behavior under any initial strategies of non-equilibrium. It proves that the government adopting negative supervision has a strikingly positive influence on controlling the quality behavior risks of enterprises. The outcomes of this study provide theoretical support for the transitional government to innovate the mode of supervision.