Abstract
This study examines the effect of shareholder taxes on bank risk-taking. Economic theory predicts that personal tax rates affect individual risk-taking through risk-sharing with the government via full loss offsets. Using plausibly exogenous changes in personal state income tax rates and detailed ownership data for a sample of S corporation banks, I find that increases in shareholder tax rates are positively (negatively) associated with bank risk-taking when shareholders can (cannot) share in risk with the government through full loss offsets. These relations are driven by banks with few shareholder conflicts and less strict regulators. Overall, the results suggest that investor-level taxes play an important role in bank risk-taking.
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