Abstract
This study addresses bank performance and its effect on disclosure practices. Results show that better-performing banks are less likely to disclose information on their corporate governance practices possibly because of their desire to avoid the two-audience signalling problem. In addition, large and highly leveraged banks tend to disclose more; the former may wish to alleviate public criticism or government interference in their affairs, while the latter may wish to minimize their agency costs of debt. This study also extends previous work by exploring an empirical exposition of the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve analysis, and thus provides compelling evidence on the reliability and robustness of the model.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
