The effect of intermediary coverage on disclosure: Evidence from a randomized field experiment

Abstract

Intermediaries play a significant role in capital markets by reducing disclosure processing costs to market participants. Yet, due to selection and other empirical challenges, the extent and mechanisms through which intermediaries influence firm disclosure are largely unknown. To address these challenges, I conduct a field experiment that randomizes coverage of a mandatory disclosure by two key intermediaries—non-governmental organizations and the media. I show that this coverage causes noncompliant firms to publish the disclosure and firms with low-quality disclosures to improve their existing disclosures. Surprisingly, new disclosures from previously noncompliant firms are on average low quality. Survey evidence and cross-sectional tests suggest the main effect may be driven by firms perceiving pressure from the regulator, whose processing costs may have been reduced. My results yield causal estimates of the effect of intermediary coverage on disclosure and shed light on the nature of the stakeholders that subsequently exert costs on firms.